I wonder if we dig into this attack would we find that COIN and ROE are the real reasons for the security lapses.
Twana
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Reuters - Major General Mark Gurganus (L), commander of RC Southwest, seen with Leon Panetta in 2012, is one of the two generals to be fired for negligence, failing to adequately protect a giant base in southern Afghanistan.
The commandant of the Marine Corps on Monday took the extraordinary step of firing two generals for not adequately protecting a giant base in southern Afghanistan that Taliban fighters stormed last year, resulting in the deaths of two Marines and the destruction of half a dozen U.S. fighter jets.
It is the first time since the Vietnam War that a general, let alone two, has been sacked for negligence after a successful enemy attack. But the assault also was unprecedented:
Fifteen insurgents entered a NATO airfield and destroyed almost an entire squadron of Marine AV-8B Harrier jets, the largest single loss of allied materiel in the almost 12-year Afghan war.
The commandant, Gen. James F. Amos, said the two generals did not deploy enough troops to guard the base and take other measures to prepare for a ground attack by the Taliban. The two, Maj. Gen. Charles M. Gurganus, the top Marine commander in southern Afghanistan at the time, and Maj. Gen. Gregg A. Sturdevant, the senior Marine aviation officer in the area, “failed to exercise the level of judgment expected of commanders of their rank,” Amos said.
“It was unrealistic to think that a determined enemy would not be able to penetrate the perimeter fence,” Amos said.
The incident brings into stark relief the unique challenges of waging war in Afghanistan. The withdrawal of thousands of U.S. troops over the past two years has forced commanders to triage, sometimes leading them to thin out defenses. The U.S. military also has been forced to rely on other nations’ troops, who often are not as well trained or equipped, to safeguard American personnel and supplies.
The attack occurred at Camp Bastion, a British-run NATO air base in Helmand province that adjoins Camp Leatherneck, a vast U.S. facility that serves as the NATO headquarters for southwestern Afghanistan. Because Leatherneck does not have a runway, the Marines use Bastion as their principal air hub in the country. Several hundred Marines live and work on the British side, and dozens of U.S. helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft are parked there.
The British are responsible for guarding Bastion, which is ringed by a chain-link fence, triple coils of razor wire and watchtowers from which sentries can scan the horizon for any potential attackers. British commanders had assigned the task of manning the towers to troops from Tonga, which has sent 55 soldiers to Afghanistan.
On the night of the attack, the Tongans left unmanned the watchtower nearest to the Taliban breach, according to an investigation by the U.S. Central Command.
Other aspects of the U.S.-British security plan were “sub-optimal,” the investigation found, with no single officer in charge of security for both Bastion and Leatherneck. The security arrangement created command-and-control relationships “contrary to the war-fighting principles of simplicity,” Amos wrote in a memo accepting the investigation.
Troop reductions also affected security measures. When Gurganus took command in 2011, about 17,000 U.S. troops were in his area of operations. By the time of the attack, in September 2012, the American contingent had dropped to 7,400 because of troop-withdrawal requirements imposed by President Obama.
In December 2011, 325 Marines were assigned to patrol the area around Bastion and Leatherneck. In the month before the attack, that number was cut to about 110.
Gurganus did seek permission in the summer of 2012 to add 160 troops to protect Bastion and Leatherneck, but his superiors in Kabul rejected the request because the military had reached a limit on forces set by the White House.
Even so, Amos said Gurganus should have reallocated troops from elsewhere to protect the encampments. “The commander still has the inherent responsibility to provide protection for his forces,” Amos said. “Regardless of where you are in a [troop] drawdown, you’re required to balance force projection with force protection.”
Despite the overall troop reduction, several officers stationed at Leatherneck at the time said that many Marines with idle time could have been assigned to guard duty. Instead, some of them took online college classes and others worked out in the gym twice a day.
In an interview with The Washington Post this year, Gurganus characterized the attack as “a lucky break” for the Taliban. “When you’re fighting a war, the enemy gets a vote,” he said.
Amos said that when he informed Gurganus that he was being relieved, Gurganus told him, “As the most senior commander on the ground, I am accountable.”
Two Marines, Lt. Col. Christopher Raible and Sgt. Bradley Atwell, were killed trying to fend off the attack. Raible, a Harrier squadron commander, charged into the combat zone armed with only a handgun. Eight other Marines were wounded in the fighting. The cost of the destroyed and damaged aircraft has been estimated at $200 million.
Although Gurganus ordered a review of security on the bases after the attack and a British general conducted a brief investigation for the NATO headquarters in Kabul, the Marine Corps waited eight months to ask the Central Command to initiate a formal U.S. investigation. Amos’s decision followed inquiries from the Pentagon’s Joint Staff, congressional staff members and a front-page article in The Post that detailed the unmanned watchtower and the reduction in troops patrolling the perimeter.
Amos said Monday that he wanted to wait for reports from NATO and the Central Command before requesting a formal investigation.
Before seeking the investigation, Amos had nominated Gurganus to receive a third star and serve as the Marine Corps staff director, the service’s third-ranking job. His nomination was placed on hold once the inquiry began.
Since his return from Afghanistan, Sturdevant has been serving as the director of plans and policy for the U.S. Pacific Command.
Amos said the decision to fire the generals was the most agonizing choice he has had to make as Marine commandant. Gurganus and Sturdevant are friends of his, he said, and their collective time in uniform totals almost seven decades.
In a statement Monday evening, Gurganus said, “I have complete trust and confidence in the leadership of our Corps and fully respect the decision of our Commandant.”
Gurganus and Sturdevant will be allowed to retire, but Amos said it will be up to Navy Secretary Ray Mabus to determine their final rank. If allowed to retire as major generals, they would be eligible to receive an inflation-adjusted annual pension of about $145,000.
The last two-star general to be fired for combat incompetence was Army Maj. Gen. James Baldwin, who was relieved of command in 1971 following a North Vietnamese attack that killed 30 soldiers at a U.S. outpost, said military historian Thomas E. Ricks.
Replies
Obama is firing all of the US Generals in preparation for his take over of America.
I agree 100%
We, The Patriots, can find a place for them.
You have a GREAT Idea!!!! !
IT IS NOT JUST A GREAT IDEA ( IT MUST BE DONE AND WE NEED TO START TALKING TO THE SHOULDERS ) .
This is not a matter of proper assessment of an operation and the finding of negligence, failure to secure what is assigned, or any other direct or indirect failure on the part of the two generals being scape-goated. The fact is, we drew down forces to the point we were not able to defend the perimeter, and since those responsible are not under the command of those who took the losses, rather than the real culprit, the commander who accepted this status change, the commander in chief, taking the responsibility for his decision, acknowledging deciding to keep a squadron of Marine jets at a base Marines were not there in sufficient numbers to control and defend was the proximate cause of the loss, and therefore a major strategic error, not a tactical error, for which the generals are responsible, it is the commander in chief who should be accountable, but isn't.
An honorable Commandant would have noted this fact, and resigned in protest, rather than throw two generals to the wolves, and keep his own seat. We send a civilian to be commander in chief, and at one time, preferred one with military experience, knowing that as "Chief" that person has final call on strategy.
We keep a "Joint Chiefs of Staff" as strategic advisors to the "commander in chief" and we expect such to listen and heed strategic calls, and know they are providing facts and experience unavailable anywhere else. Those "Joint Chiefs" each have their own "strategy staffs" from whom they expect to get the best tactical analysis from the field, and this coupled with the strategy in place, along with recommendations of change to make tactics and strategy function together to accomplish the outcome.
When the commander in chief ignores the "advise" of "The Joint Chiefs of Staff", no person below the office of "Service Commander" can rightfully be held accountable for such a failure, and such offices should not be used as the most readily proffered "sacrificial lamb", but should be a matter of charging the failure where it lies, if bad advise was given, the advisor should be fired, however if all the strategic planning was well done, rational and competent, and the tactical decision to remove troops is made by the commander in chief, for the purpose of meeting stated number goals, the commander has not followed strategy, is not therefore fulfilling the duty of "commander in chief", which is the security and proper operation of the Military, and by this, we have a commander in chief making a decision drawing down troops for political reasons, which in and of its self is not wrong, but in doing so without planning for the future, makes the decision a wrong one, and on the head of the commander in chief, not those whose job it is to advise him, and did so.
General Amos may have been a good Marine at one time, but this demonstrates he is now a political general, he holds his office by accepting the political ramifications of his interaction with obama, and by this he has become party to the treason which was part and parcel to that decision to keep the base operational without the forces to defend it.
If the commander in chief accepted his responsibility for the loss, noted it was the outcome of his decision on manning levels, his over-riding recommendations of his Generals, it would be an error, and he should be fired for lack of competence. The fact he claimed bad judgment on the part of his generals means he has to demonstrate what he was advised to do, and his following their recommendations, and since he not only didn't take responsibility, nor follow recommendations, means it's not a matter of competence, but a matter of loyalty, and the lack there of.
He was told the position was untenable, yet he chose to accept the suggestion from others, his combat experts, the Marines, were wrong, and the base was defendable as it was arrayed. He accepted the assurance of foreign politicians, and in doing so, he ignored the only people he is allowed to consider his legal military advisory staff. Doing so makes his action treason, he took his own path, against the advise of his generals and he caused the loss of a whole squadron.
This is simply the highest single crime he has committed, personally, since he was illegally installed in office, and the fact he has been allowed to handle his own failure in such a way is why we must go all the way to revolution. There is nothing short of removing the whole of the illegal, unmanageable central government which can return our Nation to its foundation.
John McClain, GySgt, USMC, ret. Vanceboro, NC
Great analysis S